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Kinetic perspectives of Plato's and Aristotle's soul theories

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ABSTRACT

There have been many scholarly works on each of Plato's and Aristotle's construction of soul, both considering them separately and conjointly. This time, my aim is to posit meeting and parting points of their views in the light of movement as a key underlying component that constitutes not only a visual metaphor, but depicts a broader pace which mirrors many aspects of their general philosophies. Therefore, I will discuss relevant medical, biological and ontological aspects of their theories while in those versatile domains reflecting back on most of the relevant points from their corpuses as well as the parallel kinetic aspects which are semi-tacitly in the formative background. Also, according to the context, I will focus either on Plato or Aristotle more, comparing the other one when needed. At the end of the paper, I will introduce some common points for the ancient period at hand, focusing on some mytho-biological beliefs and stands actual at the time, hoping to provide a broader frame of reference for the main examined question.

Key words: Plato, Aristotle, body, soul, movement, mortality, immortality, actuality, potentiality, ancient medicine, encephalocentrism, cardiocentrism.

There is a fleeting point of intersection between these two ancient philosophers which appears increasingly evasive as the study evolves under a growing scrutiny. We will see why this is so through different *centrism*s they took, as well as the structure of the soul they developed, and within which both alignment and dealignment lies.

Medical

If we start from the biological point and see Plato and Aristotle in division between the encephalocentric and cardiocentric stances they represented, our line of separation will seem as a clean slate for an indubitable interpretation. Before long, it has been established that having the heart as the central of bodily-soul functions is an obsolete theory which today serves as a historically-informative perspective. That it had many supporters, starting from the Egyptians and Mesopotamians, alongside many prominent Greek thinkers, among which Aristotle dwelled as well, is something of not much of a surprise, judging by the functions heart was in perhaps anatomically more obvious manners more visible to have. It is directly in connection with life sustaining itself, and it had also been understood in the light of its central position in a body. Aristotle underlined its importance as the heat generator, and connector of blood vessels, while assigning excessive heat regulation to the brain.¹ Along with *De anima* and other relevant writings we see no other brain function than that of a purely mechanical and biological background. Perhaps that would not be as surprising, having in mind Aristotle's understanding of the concept of a human whole, which we will discuss later. However, attributing no intellectual property whatsoever is something that at a certain point leaves no place for a more meaningful discussion which can be backed to oppose contemporary discoveries concerning the role of brain. Yet, back in the ancient times, Aristotle would find his support in Parmenides, Diocles, Praxagoras, the Stoics, the Epicureans, as well as Democritus.

When it comes to Plato, it is hardly surprising why he places the soul center in the brain. This position is not only a clear divergence from Aristotle, but it also depicts the centrality characteristic for the whole of his philosophy. Yet, before that, we should bear in mind another influ-

¹ Crivelatto, Ribatti, from: Clarke (1963), 1-14; (1973), 130-148.

ences that Plato had. Those may not have been decisive for his whole ontology, but they pose at least a dilemma at the same time enriching our interpretative perspective. Encephalocentric medical theories have been established since the VI century BC², starting with Alcmaeon of Croton and a bit later with Pythagoreans. Although a small time frame divides the two mentioned, on one hand we should follow the medical line of thought with Alcmaeon, shall we pertain to see the anatomical and biological development which was evolving at the time, but on the other hand, it is from the teaching of Pythagoreans that Plato inherited and grew his *soul-in-division* theory³. Another point to be taken to knowledge is that Plato had quite a few reflections upon medicine as such. Hippocrates, with some fifty-year distance, was a partial contemporary with Plato. Since this is the most famous physician of the ancient times, and also knowing how medicine developed in that epoch⁴, we can better understand frequent Platonic metaphors that parallel healthy and morally correct man. And yet, with this we open another twofold path: a question on whether Plato was more influenced by medicine or vice versa⁵ and how it relates to Aristotle. Starting from the latter point, a common ground amid the two can without a doubt be found in the place virtue should have in one's life. In its core, virtuous life builds an individual which then builds a well-founded society. Capacity for the excellence of character is established since the very young age by appeal to the soul itself, and therefore by education, in both specific and general terms. Aristotle advocates an education tailored for each individual, considering it better than a common one, as much as the physician's treatment is better if devised according to a particular patient.⁶ In the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well, he finds appropriate diet to enhance the body condition, at the same

² Cardiocentrics were first around IV century BC, starting with Philiston of Locri and Cnidus school.

³ Bennett (1999), 95-118.

⁴ There are many testimonies and interpretations. I will mention one: Edelstein, Ludwig, *Ancient Medicine - Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein*, selection of Owsei Temkin and C. Lilian Temkin, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967.

⁵ This is only partially related to the present topic and will therefore be discussed in limited domain.

⁶ Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea* 1180b15.

time paralleling that insight with a good person as “the measure of things”. Seeing what this sort of a person finds repulsive should be a guideline for a good life constitution, and with this comparison he satisfied both physical and psychological. As for Plato, his metaphors are in line with what has been said for Aristotle so far. But why does he insist on this specific relation between medicine and ethics? Well, firstly, it is due to the general balance theory that was very prominent at the time. Also, in Plato, there are many overlapping terms he shares with medical practitioners, which is hardly a coincidence.⁷ Furthermore, this is due to something these areas have in common, and that is *skill*. That skill begins with being able to recognise our present state⁸ and then continue with it or change it. Plato has that in mind in *Gorgias* when Socrates notices how people can try pursuing health or good behaviour regardless of their possibly different current state. He defines it in terms of “apparent and real state”, where one can be only seemingly or truly virtuous or healthy.⁹ That means there is a specific kind of knowledge doctors and those practicing the virtuous life possess. It is more than factual knowledge since it additionally employs the sense of measure that includes a sort of a talent. Thus the refined sense of subtlety grows with both knowledge, talent and experience, forming an *artistry*. However, here happens a twist in which we will now see how Aristotle mirrors against. Namely, in *Gorgias* 464c, Plato makes a double pair comparison between body and soul affairs. The first comes in form of gymnastics-

⁷ A systematic illustration of the reasons we can consider to be evidence for these analogies is well described in: Lidz (1995), 529. She mentions a shared vocabulary with the one of medical practice (*dunamis, harmonia, krasis, mixis, metron, stochasesthai*, etc.), as well as the whole concept of comparing a good life to connecting soul and knowledge “just as a sick man does to a doctor” (Plato, *Alcibiades I* 146e), where injustice is thus in the same manner connected to illness.

⁸ Notice that Aristotle in *Ethica Nicomachea* III discusses the planes of *prohairesis-bouleusis-boulēsis*, thus presenting the key which is continuity of good/bad choices, since every following decision is somewhat conditioned by the previous ones, as “paving the way for”, therefore becoming accustomed to a certain mindset, which makes for what we can call a corresponding character.

⁹ Plato, *Gorgias* 464a. More on this topic is said in: Lidz (1995), 531; As for Plato’s linking of medicine and ethics, see: L. Edelstein, *The Role of Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium*, p. 165.

medicine and the second in legislation-justice. He refers to them as artistry (τέχναι), giving them each a counter-pair which he defines as “mere flattery” and consequently a pure speculation, not knowledge. How decisive he is lies in 465a where he states: “refusal to give the name of art to anything that is irrational”. This is the point from which one can talk purely about his theory of art, but this time of more importance is the point about his stern treatment of anything that employs an occasional impromptu, which does not mean it does not rely on knowledge. We confirm that in the way Plato uses the verb στοχάζομαι. It is in a different manner than in Aristotle, whose is more in accordance with the usage of the ancient physicians’ such are Hippocrates and Galen.¹⁰ In the last two it signified a methodological conjecture of ideas, should a physician, in a lack of a more concrete knowledge, have to employ his more creative abilities in devising a treatment plan. Galen had especially cultivated the meaning which, while encompassing reasoning as a default position reflecting the scientific side of medicine, also holds a speculative and thus truly artistic side. Although “aim” is often found to be a translation for this verb, the more accurate ones pertain to “accidental” and “seeking the right measure”. However, the inaccuracy of measure shown through this term proves to be the philosophical milestone. While in Plato's writings we find condemnation for what cannot be constituted and worth of principles' certainty, in Aristotle's, altering from the characteristic found in the most of his predecessors – “measure” as μέτρον, to the “mean” – μέσον¹¹, we meet with dominance of arts over sciences, precisely because μέτρον, as the governing law showing the right measure, proves to be insufficient and methodologically inadequate when we, as humans, face the urgency for providing the right diagnose and therapy that will cater for individual needs. With all this said, we can see how Aristotle's tendencies share a core difference when it comes to the pace

¹⁰ Hp. *Off.* 4 (v. “endeavour”); Gal. *Nat. Fac.* 3. 4 (“hit upon the time at which the descent of food from the stomach takes place”); Pl. *Phlb.* 56a (“music tone produced by guess”); Pl. *R.* VII. 519c (“directing all the actions”); Arist. *Metaph.* VI. 1027a (“It is by accident that a builder restores to health, because it is not a builder but a doctor who naturally does this...”).

¹¹ This became common knowledge. But for this purpose, we mention Boudon-Millot as the one who stressed it and, more importantly, upon the verb mentioned. See: V. Boudon-Millot (2005), 94; fn. 14, p. 97.

of development to any following stages. Also, with such a strict delineation Plato insists on, Aristotle gives a fair critique¹² on the lack of some biological explanations the teacher should have presented to explain how body and mind are connected. Establishing only ethical side, no matter to what extent, does not render how those two aspects of humans interact on a biological level needed for all other upgrades, from a single man to a whole republic.

Nature and Soul

That Aristotle cares deeply for examination and establishment of the soul theory lies in whole *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia*. In the former¹³ he is concerned with what one thinks when talking about human soul and whether he would identify it with a living being, so at one point he says something like this: "We must be careful not to ignore the question whether the soul can be defined in a single unambiguous formula, as is the case with animals, or whether we must not give a separate formula for each of it, as we do for horse, dog, man, god (in the latter case the 'universal' animal - and so too every other 'common predicate' - being treated either as nothing at all or as a later product). Further, if what exists is not a plurality of souls, but a plurality of parts of one soul, which ought we to investigate first, the whole soul or its parts?"¹⁴ This part demonstrates a pure example of Aristotle's moderate realism while in the same position shows how it contrasts itself with a stand of Plato. The former recognises the eidetic principle which is perhaps first in the overall ontological sense, but that it comes *later* is something left to our noetic order, since we walk the generally inductive path of knowing. It is always interesting to see the same recognition in Plato, while at the same time observing how he tries to both neglect it and surpass it at some point. A good example for what Plato has in mind when it comes to our gnoseological advancement is the order of love as found in *The Symposium*. It is as intuitively welcoming as Aristotle's exposition of the nature building, and thus as well our mentioned way of knowing. However, the problem seems to remain in the way proposed for overcoming the

¹² Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1102b.

¹³ Aristoteles, *De anima I* 402b5-15.

¹⁴ E. M. Edghill translation with minor emendations by Daniel Kolak.

transcendent gap which seems to have been criticised so far for taking a step too further. But before we continue to that, let us take a look at another instance.

In the first chapter of this paper, Democritus is mentioned among those on the list of supporters of the cardiocentric theory. His judgement concerning the human paradigm opens a good delineation point between Aristotle's criticism of it as well as a particular introduction to the Aristotelian interpretation of the soul. In DK 68 B 105, Democritus' thoughts are clear when it comes to differentiation between rational and irrational parts of the soul. He associated rational part with the heart¹⁵, and saw the irrational one as *dispersed throughout the body*. The structure of the soul he considered to be from spherical atoms in which the *breath of the soul* is being infused.¹⁶ Before we come to Aristotle's criticism, for a moment we should turn to the general pneumatic theory that was prominent from the Anaximenes times through the other Presocratics. It was a generally common understanding that spread through the ancient medical theories, as well. Thus, the core beliefs regarding *pneuma* place it in the center of conscious life and maintenance of vital points, may they be in the heart or the brain. Of course, along with medical orientations and each Presocratic himself comes the adequate distinction in interpretation. Still, they remain in the hylomorphism which lacks subtle and necessary levels of human function establishment. Aristotle criticises just that every time he refers to his predecessors. He may have counter-arguments in those such as Simplicius, he may appear in the contemporary dilemma about Aristotle as a historian of philosophy as to some extent wrong, but his insights are doubtlessly credible enough to construe a foundation for a deeper criticism of some well-known problems, as shown with the Protagoras' problem below, as well as his own theory. In *De Anima* I¹⁷ he criticises Democritus for not seeing the difference be-

¹⁵ This is the opposite of Crivelatto & Ribatti who for some reason say: "or the brain" (*Ibid*, fn.1, p. 329).

¹⁶ Aëtius IV 3, 5; Macrobius in *Scipio* I 14, 19. This is also a form of the ancient pneumatic theory, but it differs in Aristotle in comparison to what it appears to be from Anaximenes to the other Presocratics, as Aristotle deemed it to be a locomotive function. Furley (1999), 29.

¹⁷ Aristoteles, *De anima* I, 404a27-30.

tween soul and mind when it comes to phenomenon. On the same occasion, there is also a comparison with Homer, more specifically the scene from *The Iliad* in which Hector lies wounded, not being able to differ between his thoughts and notions (φαντασία). The very similar thing is done in the third chapter of the same treatise¹⁸ where this time he calls for the *Odyssey's* and Empedocles' verses on the topic of the difference between thinking (φρονεῖν) and perceiving. The critique lies in the materiality of thinking, which is why Aristotle points the failing in most of the predecessors to spot where the deception lies. In the same line of thought he continues the talk with a look on error and its link to the animal rather than human soul.

However, this part opens a tricky slippery slope which needs a few words for itself. Firstly, a couple of passages earlier¹⁹ he states how actuality of the sense object and sense faculty is the same activity, but different being when it comes to the sensible object and percipient sense relation.²⁰ This means that Aristotle draws a line between sense and sensible objects, which can be seen *denoting potentialities or actualities*. Some sophist like Protagoras would stick to the afterimage of whatever sort, which means irrelevancy concerning the real status of the perceived object. This status means "difference in being", because a sheer impression without an object would lack notion, and that is how the notorious relativistic thinking is silenced. Secondly, considering the encompassing character of human soul which in itself holds primarily vegetative (nutritive), then sensitive (locomotive) part, Aristotle deems it should be more resistant to errors, due to the *differentia specifica* in the rational crown it possesses. He identifies the animal soul as the one more prone to errors, and erroring is *contact with the unlike*. But how should we understand this? Aristotle is introducing *De Anima III* generally talking about senses and perception which prove to be infallible on their own. Perception as such is supposed to be simply that, as it stands for a simple immediacy. The erroring potentially comes when we make an epistemic move to justify it. If so, how is proneness to mistaking something more natural to the animal soul? Furthermore, we now know for certain that senses can be deceiving by and

¹⁸ Aristoteles, *De anima III*, 427a26-427b5.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 426a15-25.

²⁰ Word choice from the same translators, see fn.14.

large. Yet, some²¹ propose we look this way: if thinking was perceiving, there would be no place for mistaking. This way Aristotle would for a moment separate intellectual from bodily processes, where we can proceed to the next step, which is how he proves immortality of the soul. This whole issue spread via a direct line to the scholastics, where we see thinkers struggling to support it. Aquinas, as perhaps the most prominent parallel to Aristotle, tries to balance the scale of the soul's incorporeal character and its detachment from the physical. And as he gradually builds upon nature from the basic to more subtle elements, where the soul is the actuality, form of the body, proving its immortality proves to be intuitively believable but not as plausible. Namely, Aquinas sees the way to defend Aristotle's position by granting soul both subsistent and incorporeal nature. Here, we will leave aside consequences and needs for it from the Christian perspective, and focus on how it could work. This would imply strong and weak subsistence. The first would refer to the capability of the soul to exist separately, while the second would include another sort of particularity, and that is soul alongside body. And although this is befitting of Aristotle's necessity to manifest particular entities in order to be in accordance with his general theory, it renders a problem an author²² dealing with this question sums like this:

“As soon as the soul is given the label of ‘this particular thing’ – the ‘substance’ for Aristotle, the human body becomes superfluous and the unity of the human being – the encompassment of spiritual and corporeal substances – is lost. Both Aquinas and Aristotle stand for the belief that one can think of and understand an object because the object's form resides in the intellect, but preserving the unity of the human being is inconsistent with the soul having an operation which the body does not share and this threatens the original idea that the soul is incorporeal. Aquinas endeavours to give an account of the soul as a strongly and weakly subsisting thing at the same time,

²¹ See a comment in fn.11 in the Serbian translation of *De Anima*, by Slobodan Blagojević.

²² Prestidge, 2014.

which is impossible, but a loss of either would undermine his whole thesis and Aristotle's too."

Although the inconsistency spoken of can refer to not only Aquinas and Aristotle, but also Plato, though in different manners²³, I do not maintain that it is necessarily that. In a general idea, unity can be sustained despite the difference in operations between body and soul, however, the question of incorporeality is being threatened, at least on the Aristotelian basis of it. But, at the first glance, the problem of that idea would either draw us to: a) justifying Plato's position, since he clearly wanted to separate those functions, and just remain in the forever-illusory-versus-taking-sides, b) "solve" it with the modern dualism, or c) we would have to consider Scotus' reminder of what "immaterial"²⁴ can mean²⁵. He lays it down as: (I) not linked to a bodily organ, (II) not extended and (III) abstract. The true immortality in its pure sense is in the third context, but we have really found no way to logically support it so far. *Abstract* can refer to the concept, but as Scotus warns, we cannot know for sure whether it would not be made of any accidental features, belonging to the material. Another problem is within the spirit-body relationship, which would at some point also include soul. Therefore, at least what remains is the problem of our knowledge of such things, which, as again Scotus had pointed out, cannot be *a priori*.

All in this chapter so far was a retrograde movement to show the key points of the potential flow-interruption in the dynamic theory as proposed by Aristotle, and also to later better compare its fluidity with what had been criticized in Plato. The predominant focus on the Philosopher here is due to the many explicit points that show themselves in their kinetic necessity. More explicitly, in the twelfth chapter of *De Anima* III²⁶ he states: "Therefore no body which is not stationary has soul

²³ Plato's comprises of the detachment of intellectual and mortal. In every sense he explicitly accented it

through the dialogues.

²⁴ The common ground in this context is to identify *immaterial* with *immortal*.

²⁵ *Ibid*, fn.16.

²⁶ Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 434b7-8.

without sensation." What *therefore* was introduced with once again implies order of being. Animals cannot possess souls and not have the basis of it all: sensation. Also, any movement without this capability would lead to body's destruction. Aristotle wants to connect sensing, perceiving and understanding through touch which he finds as the all-encompassing manifest of interaction. How it works we should see first through the mentioned hylomorphic governing principle which is led by soul's incorporeality and its inherent ability to regulate it all via more sophisticated psychic functions. This shows the gradual advancement from presentation to thought and is direct opposite of Plato's tendency to separate the higher psychic activities from the mortal, mutable and bodily. To additionally see the extent to which Aristotle spread his idea of nature-building, we should see his understanding of *sensus communis* (κοινή αἴσθησις) as the synthesis for all the five senses, which precisely in their number enable better noticing of the common in something. It is *sensus communis* which can follow the motion in its broadest meaning, which for Aristotle is continuity, meaning temporal and spatial. It is the form and forming, eidetic in its very constitution which has an ontological primacy and thus incorporates all other aspects, such as matter and purpose, and in the end all four causes. Like so, starting with the senses and going to reasoning while understanding the overall cognitive apparatus and external constitution of the world is to see that motion is what constitutes not only the outwards, but actually vice versa: my own psychosomatic constitution is unfolding in an inner movement alongside perceiving movement in the outside world. Nonetheless, perception is transcending the modern subject-object gap and that is the last thing we should accent here. Cradling in our way of thinking would mean stripping Aristotle's soul structure of its form-purpose-movement-matter all-mutually-pervading character.²⁷

²⁷ Slobodan Blagojević (fn.15) formulates this quite understandably: "For Aristotle direct perception is already apprehending *form without matter* – meaning it is already eidetic in its basis, if it's understood as *forming*, by the model in *Physics*. [...] Matter is not on the side of the perceived object, it is in the soul, and that is why it can apprehend form without matter: direction in Aristotle is the opposite from the subject-object relation of modernity." (My own translation).

The Movers

Plato and Aristotle share a key similarity when it comes to treating eternity. Although they differ in numerous aspects, ultimately they represents a still picture of Truth by which everything else takes shape. In Plato's universe we should probably attribute it to the One, although what it really stands for remains somewhat debatable. It is mostly seen as the Form of Good, which would match the supreme place it has in Plato's corpus, and for this purpose we will treat it that way. Whatever the top entity may be, there is also an intermediary in the form of the Demiurge, since it possesses immortality and eternal knowledge of the Forms. The vital is that it is also a rational deity since it molded chaos and brought order. Demiurge follows the line we are used to when referring to perfection in Plato. It incorporates intelligence in soul and soul in the body; the world it creates must be one in number, as one pertains to wholeness. This sort of impeccable creation is also spherical and moves by rotation, and as much as any human, it also has its soul, World Soul. The process of its creation in *Timaeus* follows three (of the five Plato mentions in *Sophist*) *megista gene* (Sameness, Difference, Being) or *common concepts*, as they are also called. From the way they manifest we see they are also divided to that invisible and visible and so throughout the whole Platonic creation we can follow this dualistic manifest.

The disciple was not as much into the mythopoetic explanation, although despite the common critique, this is not something in Plato's thought that renders it implausible *per se*. The main initial difference between the two would lie in that Aristotle does not rely on the initial chaos, especially because nothing moves randomly and unintentionally. In the furthest, he puts what he sees as a logical presupposition that there must be something unmoved and unmoving itself in order to grant purpose to all that continuity and motion. What is also necessary is proving it is actuality, because potentiality cannot grant permanence in that repetitive flow of things. That is why eternity as such, as he also sees it through Plato's Forms is not enough (*Met.* Λ 1071b, 1072a) and there must be something which initiates movement but remains independent from that action. Having explicitly posited actuality as the essence of the Unmoved Mover he explained it in a great deal. With all said so far, it is not difficult to see why there is such a strong necessity to deal with the substantial guarantee of all the motion, additionally because he remains

dissatisfied with Plato's lack of motion explanation. What he thinks when saying that, connects Λ and Θ books of *Metaphysics*:

“Again, Plato at least cannot even explain what it is that he sometimes thinks to be the source of motion, i.e., that which moves itself; for according to him the soul is posterior to motion and coeval with the sensible universe. Now to suppose that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another wrong; we have explained the distinction.” (*Met.* Λ 1072a)

“In time it is prior in this sense: the actual is prior to the potential with which it is formally identical, but not to that with which it is identical numerically. What I mean is this: that the matter and the seed and the thing which is capable of seeing, which are potentially a man and corn and seeing, but are not yet so actually, are prior in time to the individual man and corn and seeing subject which already exist in actuality. But prior in time to these potential entities are other actual entities from which the former are generated; for the actually existent is always generated from the potentially existent by something which is actually existent—e.g., man by man, cultured by cultured—there is always some prime mover; and that which initiates motion exists already in actuality.” (*Met.* Θ 1049d)

Epochal commons

Talking about senses and sense perception, we cannot neglect both the role particular senses stood out in and the role light had for a Greek thinker of the time. It seems that because they receive light, eyes had a special place in Greek sense order. Light itself is something that has a positive connotation and has been also a symbol for the eidetic light of mind, and thus thought. In Plato, in the literature style unique to him, we find these references quite explicitly. So, in the VI chapter of the *Republic* the domain of Good is determined. It comes with a statement that

Good is above knowledge, truth and essence (οὐσία)²⁸. “Glauco exclaimed, very comically, ‘Save us all, what an amazing transcendence!’” (509c). In the original writing we find this exclamation is addressed to Apollo, god of light himself. Plato gradually starts his talk from the light, itself divine, proceeding through discovery that the capability for looking is neither only sun, nor only eye, although power of the sun is spilled in such a causal way towards the eye, making it see from all the gratefulness, to highlight with: “ [...] as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.” (508c)

But before Plato there is a more cryptic forerunner who deals with Apollo in a greater detail. In his thought we can even find gradation of senses, from the more to less important, and on this occasion I would stick to only two thoughts of his. Heraclitus worships the symbolism of Apollo to the extent of equating life and light.²⁹ Light has the uncovering power which in this automatism transforms the viewer. And humans are particular viewers, blessed with the inner light of mind, synthetic apparatus in its core. When those two lights *touch*, what we are immersed in is the insight of the nature of things. But to what extent light bears its importance cannot be summed in the authority of eye only. At least it could not have been for Heraclitus. That is why in DK7 he recognises smell as of big of the importance. Nostrils which would distinguish between all the things turned to smoke still possess some quality for doing so. The last in the line of interpretation would simply be to say that in Hades the soul will not be equipped with eyes or other senses as it is now. And if that is the place of *no-eye-seeing*, there must be some sort of a recognition. Why it would perhaps stick to smell in this situation is due to two points: one is the line of etymology which proposes the name originated from the Proto-Greek word meaning “unseen”, and it is quite possible Heraclitus followed this belief (or knowledge?). Kirk and Mikecin propose this line of thought as well. They take their cue from

²⁸ Pl. R. VI. 509b.

²⁹ That we can find fragments that point to the life in death and darkness is something as well true. But because light of some other, rational sort has its universal place even there, I would stick not to go to great lengths with intricate and long explanations. Maybe the most prominent is fragment DK26 in which we see that *man in the night lights himself light with the eyesight extinguished*.

DK67 as well, where *fire mingled with spices is named according to the savour of each*. The first author mentions it in the connection with DK98, which perhaps in Heraclitus is a resume of the ancient understanding as ψυχή as a breath.³⁰ The second reminds that the part καθ' ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου is ambiguous, as it can be translated both *by the pleasure of each man* and *by the smell of each smell*.³¹ At some point, the general view will concern the transformative place that happens when we use senses. They are interchangeable and can also bring an ontological change, which is the best portrayed from the fragment DK26. For “kindle” and “touch” the same verb ἄπτομαι (in 3rd Sg.) is used. This verb has many meanings, among which are: *kindle, fasten, bind, join, touch, engage, take part in, attack, perceive, reach, apprehend, affect*.³² Going a step further, we find this verb in the New Testament twice³³, where both meanings can come down to “change by touch”.

Not striving to make an anachronism here, but even without ontological change we can agree that touch of any kind is a connection that leads to something third, as a new. Thus it is not surprising that in Aristotle we find not only a theory of colours as borders of translucence, we also find that the nature of light is in the translucent which is undefined³⁴. His definition of the whole process of visual perception and colour grasping comes in, again, through the critique of the predecessors who saw it as outpouring. What they should have seen, according to Aristotle, is that perception must be based on touch, because it forms when perceived is moving the perceptive field³⁵.

³⁰ Kirk (1949), 384-393.

³¹ Mikecin (2013), 284.

³² [http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=a\(/ptw](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=a(/ptw).

³³ Lk. 7:39, “When the Pharisee who had invited Jesus saw this, he said to himself, ‘If this man were a prophet, He would know who this is and what kind of woman **is touching** Him – for she is a sinner!’”; (Jn. 5:18) “We know that anyone born of God does not keep on sinning; the One who was born of God protects him, and the evil one cannot **touch** him.” The form of the verb is ἄπτεται, the same as in the fragment (See my Master’s thesis: Milić (2016), fn. 65, p.25).

³⁴ Aristoteles, *De sensu et sensibilibus*, 439a25-27.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 440a17-20.

Conclusion

When all is summed and reflected upon in the closing aura of reminiscing, it seems like in the background of motion two opposing paradigms are formed. Everything that moves is prone to change, and therefore dying, having for its rival the unchanging and eternal. On the other hand, the flow of things among and in themselves is what represents life. Both ways of thinking were present, sometimes even in the same thinkers. In Heraclitus the change of opposites is what keeps the planet spinning, giving it balance and the state as we know. The wisdom lies in spotting this *perpetuum mobile* which has its inflow and outflow in the unchangeable ruler which is Logos. We can say the same happens with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, although his natural science is much more developed and in a greater detail. The main playground remains in the intelligible soul, which is human. Either in the dualistic manner Plato proposes, or on the gradual path of building upon from the less to more complex and subtler, such Aristotle vigorously tries to embed in his work. What remains are a few points: first, it is to finish the talk on the transcendent gap Plato made and which we opened (p. 4). In *Timaeus* (71d, e) Plato adds a whiff of the additional knowledge which is beyond our powers we are used to daily, but is in our power to get a certain grasp of it, knowing it was definitely from the gods. He has in mind the power of prophesying, which manifests itself in dreams or ill states of being. This is not either something uncommon or surprising, having in mind all the parts of us that can prevent the signs to be apprehended. Putting aside our mortal nature and our reason, we can approach godly and immortal. This flair can also be found in the irrational behaviour such as perhaps any leap of faith one knows of in monotheistic religions. However, due to the statements like these and his general theory of anamnesis, Aristotle tried to discredit Plato's words. In *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, he states precisely that recollection concerns fragments of memories without a present image or object³⁶ (*Mem. et Rem.* II 451a20-25; 451a30 – 451b1). This means that at the same time he gives the important insight that recollection does not mean previous forgetting, and there-

³⁶ Aristoteles, *De memoria et reminiscentia* II 451a20-25; 451a30 – 451b1.

fore fails to completely discredit Plato's theory³⁷, as even without its criticized mythological frame it remains primarily a theory of cognitive mechanism embedded in the atemporal, not a theory of remembering specific objects. However, the most valuable differentiation here is in Aristotle's tendency to show the primarily temporal character of memory and recollection, as time and change in things themselves must be simultaneous, while Plato remains in the essentially atemporal domain of thought on the matter, regarding the divine realm as the basis of our true Knowledge. Thus, Aristotle comes under the spotlight with abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις) as the key presentation of his moderate realism stand, not creating universals apart from the individual substances, leaving us space for a legitimate interpretation of it as a "selective attention"³⁸.

Either way, what remains very appealing to follow in the fluidity of the world in Aristotle's soul theory proposes is the following: First, the difference in what can and cannot be divided in soul's judgement. He refers to the point (στιγμή) as "some" previous thinkers but for the same term proposes σημείον which is a continuous and dynamic point of divisibility. He is a supporter of non-static geometry, which would in this particular place imply his explanation that soul makes its perceptive unity through time. Time and soul are intertwined in this unity and duality of their being, that is why σημείον is a fluid point of realizing this, and this sort of hidden movement Aristotle wants to talk about the most.³⁹ Another is that Aristotle prefers to refrain from ultimately dividing the soul. For there is appetency (ὄρεκτικόν) which exists both in the rational and in the irrational parts of the soul, and it also manifests as will, desire and passion. This is connected to all the aspects of develop-

³⁷ Additional problems arise in Mem. et Rem. 452a when Aristotle mentions the easiness to remember the fixed mathematical/geometrical orders and that if one needs the help of another to remember, that is not recollection anymore. It is not as intuitive as suggested that it is easier to remember some mathematical principles. Even if it was, it would then go more to Plato's favour. Also, having another's help does not deprive one to ultimately remember alone.

³⁸ A. Bäck, *The Concept of Abstraction*, p. 9.

³⁹ Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 427a5-10.

ment of a being, starting from spatial movement which is symbolised in nutrition, growth, breathing, awake state, etc.⁴⁰

With all said, whether we hold more argumentative plausibility in Plato's leap of mind and faith, or Aristotle's all-permeating causality, we should strive to understand the importance of kinesis and actuality of the body given by the soul's constitution and manifesto in both philosophers. Their attempts were serious harbingers of the intricacies of the soul and the world that are still active in their evasiveness, centuries later.

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⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 432b5-15.

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